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ABSTRACT 
The second generation nuclear power plants were designed and built to withstand without loss 
to the systems, structures, and components necessary to ensure public health and safety during 
design basis accidents (DBAs). In the transient and accident analysis the effects of single active 
failures and operator errors were considered. There are also accident sequences that are possible but 
were judged to be too unlikely and therefore were not fully considered in the design process of 
second generation reactors. In that sense, they were considered beyond the scope of design-basis 
accidents that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand. Such accident sequences 
have been analysed in the past to fully understand the capability of a design. 
The requirements to analyse such sequences for existing reactors have been introduced after 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. In 2012 the design extension conditions (DECs) were introduced in 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements for the design of nuclear power 
plants (NPPs). Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) requirements of 
existing reactors for DEC were introduced in 2014. The purpose of considering DEC is to further 
improve safety by enhancing the plant’s capability to withstand the conditions generated by 
accidents that are more severe than DBAs. This concept by IAEA and WENRA (WENRA 
definition of DEC is consistent with IAEA definition from 2012, in which DEC with prevention of 
core melt is called DEC A) is not completely new, since some multiple failures have already been 
considered in the design of existing reactors, for example anticipated transients without scram and 
station blackout. The research for beyond design basis accidents with non-degraded core (i.e. DEC 
A) for existing reactors has been already done in 80’s and 90’ of the previous century. The purpose 
of this paper is to review that research. The tests performed include total loss of feedwater, station 
blackout, small break without high pressure safety injection, steam generator tube rupture with no 
high pressure safety injection etc. Besides review of experiments performed on integral test 
facilities, examples of DEC A tests, which have been analysed at Jožef Stefan Institute using 
RELAP5 or TRACE computer code in the last three decades, will be presented too. 
Keywords: design extension conditions, RELAP5, TRACE, safety analysis 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The existing reactors were designed and built to withstand without loss to the systems, 
structures, and components necessary to ensure public health and safety during design basis 
accidents (DBAs). In the transient and accident analysis the effects of single active failures and 
operator errors were considered. There are also accident sequences that are possible but were 
judged to be too unlikely and therefore were not fully considered in the design process of second 
generation reactors. In that sense, they were considered beyond the scope of design-basis accidents 
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analysed in the past to fully understand the capability of a design. They were called beyond design 
basis accidents (BDBA). However, after Fukushima Dai-ichi accident the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted term design extension conditions (DEC) [1]. 
The term “design extension conditions” has rather long history and was introduced during the 
design of the reactors of third generation. The DEC was introduced to define some selected accident 
sequences due to multiple failures. The design extension conditions were introduced as preferred 
method for giving due consideration to the complex sequences and severe accidents at the design 
stage without including them in the design basis conditions [3]. On the other hand, the Western 
European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) recommended a “design extension” analysis 
in 2007 [4] and they proposed a list of events to be analysed at minimum. By its meaning this list 
corresponds to DEC without core melt. WENRA reference levels (RLs) from 2014 [5] introduced 
DEC term. The WENRA guidance document for issue F [6] explains that DEC in WENRA RLs are 
consistent with the definition of DEC in IAEA SSR-2/1 [1], published in 2012. DEC are more 
complex and/or more severe than conditions postulated as design basis accidents [6]. 
The paper [7] recommends that the IAEA requirements and guidelines keep up the definition 
of severe accidents so that this type of accident be clearly identified, linked to the partial or 
complete melting of reactor core. The IAEA DEC term has been redefined in 2016 as follows: 
“Postulated accident conditions that are not considered for design basis accidents, but that are 
considered in the design process for the facility in accordance with best estimate methodology, and 
for which releases of radioactive material are kept within acceptable limits.” WENRA did not 
follow the new IAEA DEC, which modification is significant. 
The DEC concept by IAEA and WENRA (DEC with prevention of core melt is called DEC 
A) is not completely new, since some multiple failures have already been considered in the design, 
for example anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) and station blackout (SBO). Also, the 
research for beyond design basis accidents with non-degraded core (i.e. DEC A) for existing 
reactors has been already done in 80’s and 90’ of the previous century. 
In this paper review of that research is done. Besides review of experiments performed on 
integral test facilities, examples of DEC A tests, which have been analysed at Jožef Stefan Institute 
using RELAP5 or TRACE computer code in the last three decades, will be presented too. 
2 INITIATING EVENTS FOR DEC A 
WENRA guidance document [6] for issue F provides the following list of DEC A (with a note 
that final sets of conditions selected for DEC A analysis will be plant and site specific, developed 
on the basis of the following non-exhaustive list, which applies mainly to pressurized water reactors 
(PWR) and boiling water reactors): 
 Initiating events induced by earthquake, flood or other natural hazards exceeding the 
design basis events (see Issue T [5]); 
 Initiating events induced by relevant human-made external hazards exceeding the de-
sign basis events; 
 Prolonged station black out (SBO; for up to several days); 
o SBO (loss of off-site power and of stationary primary emergency alternate 
current (AC) power sources) 
o total SBO (SBO plus loss of all other stationary AC power sources), unless 
there are sufficiently diversified power sources which are adequately protected 
 Loss of primary ultimate heat sink, including prolonged loss (for up to several days); 
 Anticipated transient without scram (ATWS); 
 Uncontrolled boron dilution; 
 Total loss of feed water; 
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 Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) together with the complete loss of one emergency 
core cooling function (e.g. high pressure injection (HPI) or low pressure injection 
(LPI)); 
 Total loss of the component cooling water system; 
 Loss of core cooling in the residual heat removal mode; 
 Long-term loss of active spent fuel pool cooling; 
 Multiple steam generator tube ruptures (PWR, pressurized heavy water reactors); 
 Loss of required safety systems in the long term after a design basis accident. 
The IAEA document [8] states that the list of DEC may include: 
 ATWS; 
 SBO; 
 Loss of core cooling in the residual heat removal mode; 
 Extended loss of cooling of fuel pool and inventory; 
 Loss of normal access to the ultimate heat sink. 
The IAEA document [8] further provides an example list of additional DECs derived from 
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA): 
 Total loss of feed water; 
 LOCA plus loss of one emergency core cooling system (either the high pressure or the 
low pressure emergency cooling system); 
 Loss of the component cooling water system or the essential service water system 
(ESWS); 
 Uncontrolled boron dilution; 
 Multiple steam generator tube ruptures (MSGTR) (for PWRs); 
 Steam generator (SG) tube ruptures induced by main steam line break (MSLB) (for 
PWRs); 
 Uncontrolled level drop during mid-loop operation (for PWRs) or during refuelling. 
When comparing the WENRA and IAEA list, first major difference is that WENRA list 
includes initiating events induced by earthquake, flood or other natural hazards exceeding the 
design basis events. However, IAEA document [8] stressed that “some Member States tend to 
include in the list of DECs also some external hazards that were not considered in the past (e.g. 
earthquake exceeding the design basis earthquake, commercial air craft impact, etc.). In the IAEA 
terminology, a DEC is a postulated plant state (see Table 1) that is determined by a postulated 
sequence of events, and for the same reasons that design basis hazards are not considered DBAs, 
more severe hazards are not considered DECs although they might result in a DBA or possibly in 
DEC.” Second difference is that IAEA provides deterministically and probabilistically identified 
list. 
3 REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON BDBA WITHOUT CORE DEGRADATION FOR 
EXISTING REACTORS 
In this section selected BDBA experiments without core degradation are briefly described in Tables 
1 and 2.  
Table 1 shows tests for accident management in PWRs, in which operator actions were 
studied for BDBA with non-degraded core (DEC A). Experiments were mainly selected from cross-
reference matrix for accident management for non-degraded core, which has been created in the 
frame of OECD/NEA [9]. 
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Table 1: Accident management in PWRs for BDBA with non-degraded core (DEC A) 
Test No. Test type Brief description 
PKL Ill B1.2 
Total loss of feedwater with 
secondary side feed and 
bleed 
Total loss of feedwater (loss of main and auxiliary feedwater) with no 
core cooling systems (high and low pressure injection pumps and 
accumulators) was studied. Secondary side bleed and feed was 
performed. Injection of water was due to flashing in feedwater line 
and subsequent injection by a mobile pump [9]. 
BETHSY 
5.2c2 Total loss of feedwater 
During BETHSY (Boucle d'Etudes Thermohydrauliques de 
Systemes) test 5.2c2 [10], the emergency operating procedure (EOP) 
was conducted in accordance with the rules presently implemented in 
plant control rooms, which allow operators more time for the 
recovery of feedwater systems: it consisted in manually starting the 
high pressure injection system (HPIS) as soon as 2 SG liquid levels 
reached 3 m; as a consequence, primary pressure slowly increases up 
to 16.3 MPa, and is then maintained at this value through pressurizer 
power operated relief valves (PORVs) automatic operation. 30 
minutes after EOP initiation, or earlier if the core outlet fluid 
temperature reaches 603 K, the pressurizer PORVs are actuated at 
full discharge capacity.  
BETHSY 
6.2TC 
6” cold leg break without 
HPIS and LPIS 
BETHSY 6.2TC test was a 15.24 cm (6 inch) cold leg break in the 
loop one without available high pressure and low pressure safety 
injection system. Accumulators were available in the intact loops. 
The main aims of this test were to compare the counterpart test data 
from BETHSY and Large Scale Test Facility (LSTF) facilities and 
qualification of CATHARE 2 computer code. 
BETHSY 
9.1b 
2" cold leg break without 
HPIS and with delayed 
ultimate procedure 
BDBA involves two failures: a break on the cold leg together with a 
complete failure of the HPIS, combined with a human error regarding 
the conditions in which the operators start the Ultimate Operating 
Procedure (UOP). The UOP then consists in depressurizing the 




SGTR with HPIS and AFW 
unavailable 
The simultaneous failure of the high pressure safety injection and 
auxiliary feedwater systems is a Beyond Design Basis Accident, 
which leads to core heat up, if no additional measures are taken. 
During the test 9.3 the efficiency of both the steam generator 
atmospheric steam dump and the depressurization of the primary 
circuit via the pressurizer relief valve is investigated [11]. 
LSTF  PWR Cold-Leg small-break LOCA with total HPI failure 
Cold-leg break tests were conducted at the LSTF for five break areas 
0.5%, 1%, 2.5%, 5 and 10% of the scaled cold-leg flow area, with 
totally failed HPI [12]. 
LSTF 
0.5% cold leg small-break 
LOCA total failure of the 
HPI and auxiliary feedwater 
(AFW) systems 
The depressurization procedure was simulated in a 0.5% cold-leg 
break LOCA experiment [13]. 
LSTF SB-
SG-11 
SGTR concurrent with 
secondary break 
In this experiment, the pressure difference between the primary side 
of the steam generator (SG) and the secondary side of SG is kept so 
high that the two-phase critical flow is observed for a long time. The 
secondary break was simulated for the feedwater line because this 
was the only line which can be connected to the break catch tank 
(ST). The secondary initial level for the affected SG was lowered to 
4.3m to scale the inventory. The recovery action was simulated by 
depressurizing, starting 600 s after scram. Also, the pressurizer 
auxiliary spray was activated subsequently [9]. 
 
New design includes design features aimed at preventing the onset of a severe accident, 
including severe accident precursors identified in SECY-90-016 [18] and SECY-93-087 [19]: 
ATWS, mid-loop operation, station blackout (SBO) event, fire, and an intersystem loss of coolant 
accident (ISLOCA). Similarly WENRA [20] provides examples of multiple failure scenarios (DEC 
A) to be prevented in new designs: LOCA, station blackout, total loss of feedwater and ATWS. 
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Table 2 shows typical multiple failure scenarios (ATWS, mid-loop operation, SBO and LOFW 
followed by small break LOCA). 
Table 2: BDBAs with non-degraded core (DEC A), which typically need to be prevented 
Test No. Test type Brief description 
LSTF TR·LF-
06 
Pump seal leak following 
station blackout 
The test simulated a pump seal leak following a station blackout (or 
TMLB’, where T = transient event, M = failure of the secondary 
system steam relief valves and power conversion system, L = failure 
of secondary system steam relief valves and auxiliary feedwater 
system, and B' = failure to recover onsite and offsite AC power) 
transient. The test was initiated with an "accelerated transient" which 
was designed to obtain primary and secondary states including: steam 
generator (SG) secondary sides dried out; primary side reached 
saturation at the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) 
opening setpoint pressure. After these states were reached, at a scaled 
core power of 1.2%, a cold leg break, with an area of 0.1% of the 
scaled cold leg cross-sectional area, was opened to simulate a pump 
seal leak [9]. 
LOBI A2-90 SBO-ATWS 
LONOP-ATWS or “SBO” anticipated transient caused by loss of 




Loss of RHR at mid-loop 
operation with pressuriser 
and SG manways open 
The test includes a loss of residual heat removal (RHR) system 
during mid-loop operation at 0.5% of nominal value core power. 
Initial liquid level in reactor coolant system (RCS) was at horizontal 
axis of the hot legs. Pressurizer and steam generator manways were 
opened 1 s after the transient was initiated [9]. 
LOFT L9-1 / 
L3-3 
Total loss of feedwater 
(LOFW) accident followed 
by small break LOCA 
Experiment L9-1 was the first anticipated transient with multiple 
failures performed at Loss-of-Fluid-Test (LOFT), and consisted of a 
simulated LOFW accident with delayed reactor scram and no 
auxiliary feedwater injection.  
Experiment L3-3 simulated two independent recovery procedures 
from the LOFW accident L9-1, without engaging the emergency core 
coolant (ECC). 
LOFT L9-3 Loss of feedwater without reactor trip 
Experiment L9-3 conducted in the LOFT facility was a unique one 
simulating an ATWS event in pressurized water reactor. The 
experiment simulated a loss of feedwater induced ATWS in a 
commercial plant. The experiment consisted of two parts: the ATWS 
itself, which lasted about 600 s, and the plant recovery [15]. 
LOFT L9-4 
Loss-of-offsite-power 
accident without reactor 
trip 
This was an anticipated-transient-without-scram test initiated from 
typical commercial PWR operating conditions in which the primary 
coolant and main feedwater pumps, the steam generator main 
feedwater discontinued, and the main steam-outlet valve closed. 
Auxiliary feedwater was initiated after a delay of 10 s to simulate the 
start-up time of the diesel generators, and the pressuriser PORV and 
spray were both inoperative throughout the transient [16]. 
* - low power operation 
 
4 REVIEW OF BDBA (DEC A) SIMULATIONS AT JOŽEF STEFAN INSTITUTE 
Results of selected simulations of experiments described in Tables 1 and 2 are presented. This 
includes BETHSY 9.1b, 6.2TC and 6.9c tests, and LOFT L9-1/L3-3 test. The scenarios with 
multiple failures simulated for Krško Nuclear Power Plant are not in the scope of this paper (e.g. 
references [21] through [27]). 
BETHSY was an integral test facility, which was designed to simulate most pressurized water 
reactor accidents of interest, study accident management procedures and validate the computer 
codes. It was a scaled down model of three loop Framatome (now AREVA NC) nuclear power 
plant with the thermal power 2775 MW. 
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The LOFT facility was a 50 MWth two-loop PWR, which was designed to study the thermo-
hydraulic response of the system to a variety of simulated LOCA scenarios. The facility 
incorporated similar hydraulic components to those in commercial PWRs, although the components 
were volumetrically scaled by a ratio of 1/60 in comparison to a full-scale commercial PWR with a 
power of 3000 MWth. Inherent in the scaling are some compromises in the geometric similarity. In 
particular, the 1.7m-long LOFT reactor core was around half the length of that of a commercial 
PWR, but the Emergency Core Coolant (ECC) system was designed to inject a similar amount of 
core coolant in the event of an LOCA.  
 
4.1 Simulation of BETHSY 9.1b 
The Bethsy 9.1.b test is a scaled 5.08 cm cold leg no. 1 break without high pressure safety 
injection and with delayed operator action for secondary system depressurization. Due to core 
heatup the operator depressurized the secondary side by atmospheric relief steam dump valves. In 
the simulation this operator action was delayed. The test was analyzed in the frame of international 
standard problem 27 (ISP-27) performed to validate the thermalhydraulic computer codes. The test 
scenario was the following: break was opened in the cold leg no. 1 (initiation of the transient). 
When the maximum heater rod cladding temperature reaches 723 K, the ultimate procedure was 
started by opening three steam line dumps to atmosphere. When pressurizer pressure dropped below 
4.2 MPa accumulators started to inject and they stopped to inject below 1.46 MPa. The low pressure 
safety injection system was activated when the primary pressure was below 0.91 MPa. When stable 
residual heat removal system operating conditions prevail, the transient was terminated. 
The aim of the study [28] was to perform calculations with to Jožef Stefan Institute (JSI) 
available RELAP5 versions using as much as possible the same input model in order to see the 
differences between the code versions. As it is difficult to compare so many calculations, line colors 
are selected in such way that MOD3.3 versions have green color palette, MOD3.2 are in red and 
pink and MOD3.1 has blue palette. Pressurizer pressure and maximum heater rod temperature are 
shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. As high pressure injection is not available, the core 
starts to uncover and when maximum heater rod cladding temperature reaches 723 K, the ultimate 
procedure was started by opening three steam line dumps to atmosphere, in the calculations a bit 
earlier than in the experiment. This causes secondary pressure decrease, followed by primary 
system pressure decrease. When primary system dropped below the accumulator injection setpoint, 
the injection started and soon the clad temperature started to decrease. Again the heatup in the 
calculation is earlier than in the experiment. Later the accumulators are emptied, however cooling is 
established through the secondary side, and therefore the primary pressure is decreasing. When 
reaching the low pressure injection system setpoint, the low pressure injection started and the 
experiment lasted until the stable residual heat removal system conditions were reached. From 
results it may be seen that secondary side depressurization prevented core heatup as primary 
pressure drops below accumulator injection. 
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Figure 2: Maximum heater rod cladding temperature – BETHSY 9.1b 
 
4.2 Simulation of BETHSY 6.2TC 
BETHSY 6.2TC test was a 15.24 cm (6 inch) cold leg break in the loop no. 1 without 
available high pressure and low pressure safety injection system. The experiment started with 
opening of the valve simulating the break in the cold leg no. 1 at the time 0 s. Sudden primary 
pressure drop caused scram signal when pressure was below 13.0 MPa and safety injection (SI) 
signal was generated, when primary pressure was below 11.7 MPa. At scram signal all three 
primary pumps were stopped and natural circulation regime took over the primary system. The 
hot parts of the primary circuit (upper head, upper plenum, SG U-tubes) started to boil. The 
formation of loop seal caused the core level depression. The drop in the core collapsed liquid 
level was stopped at 134 s by loop seal clearance on the three loops. The loop seal clearance 
occurred at the same time on all three loops. After loop seal clearance the core liquid level rose 
again due to pressure balances and then started to drop again due to inventory loss through the 
break. When primary pressure dropped below 4.2 MPa, the accumulator injection started, which 
recovered the core. The accumulator injection was stopped on the basis of low level criterion. 
After it stopped, in the absence of high pressure injection, the primary circuit emptied through 
the break and third core uncovery occurred. The low pressure injection was not activated by 
assumption. The test was ended when the primary pressure dropped below 0.7 MPa. 
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The results of simulation [29] are shown for pressurizer pressure and maximum heater rod 
temperature in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. For RELAP5 original Ransom-Trapp break 
flow model the values of 0.85, 1.25 and 0.75 were used for subcooled, two phase and 
superheated discharge coefficient, respectively. For TRACE break model the values of 0.8 and 
0.9 were used for subcooled and two phase discharge coefficients, respectively. The pressure 
drop (see Figure 3) is faster in case of TRACE calculation than in the experiment, while in the 
case of RELAP5 is slower. In the case of heater rod surface temperature (see Figure 4) the timing 
of heatup prediction was better in the case of TRACE, while heatup rate was better predicted in 
the case of RELAP5. It may be seen that due to unavailability of high and low pressure injections 
systems the core heatup would continue, if test would not be ended. In such a case new 













































Figure 4: Maximum heater rod cladding temperature – BETHSY 9.1b 
 
4.3 Simulation of BETHSY 6.9c 
Test 6.9c OECD ISP-38 includes a loss of RHR system during mid-loop operation at 0.5% of 
nominal value core power. Initial liquid level in RCS was at horizontal axis of the hot legs. 
Pressurizer and steam generator manways were opened 1 s after the transient was initiated. Boil 
away and liquid entrainment through manways are in that case the physical phenomena which 
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mainly determine the RCS behaviour while both the presence of non condensable gas above the 
liquid level and heat removal by SG's play a minor role. The initial conditions for this tests are: 
RCS at atmospheric pressure with a liquid level at mid height of hot legs, fluid and structure 
temperatures close to 373 K in the whole RCS (the liquid heat up phase was ignored in test), and the 
SG secondary sides are filled with air and isolated. Manways are simulated by geometrically scaled 
orifices with the same form loss coefficient. 
At the start of the test the water in the primary circuit was at the centre line level of the hot 
legs and very close to the saturation temperature. The manways in the pressuriser and steam 
generator were opened and the core power increased to 140kW. Boiling occurred almost 
immediately. 
Over the first 3000 s of the transient, water was entrained·into the surgeline and then carried 
on up into the pressuriser by the high steam flow rate. It accumulated in the pressuriser. The 
accumulated water was not held there continuously, but twice it flowed back to the hot leg and then 
partially refilled. Finally as the mixture level in the vessel fell the pressuriser and surge line emptied 
completely. 
During this period also there was water entrained into the vertical part of the hot leg and the 
steam generator inlet plenum and tubes. These also emptied when the mixture level fell below the 
hot legs. 
After about 6000 s the level fell sufficiently for the core to become uncovered and the 
temperature of the fuel rod simulators to rise. When the temperature rose above 523 K, emergency 
core cooling was initiated by a (simulated) gravity driven feed. This was sufficient to halt the core 
heat-up and re-establish the primary circuit inventory. The test was stopped when the level in the 
vessel reached the mid loop condition. The total test time was nearly 10000 s. The simulated mass 
calculated by different computers is shown in Figure 5. The experimental line is blue. 
 
 
Figure 5: Mass in primary system – BETHSY 6.9c 
The calculations were performed on DEC Alpha and SUN Sparc workstation (labelled “DEC 
Alpha” and “Calc1”) using base input deck and modified input models (“Calc 2 vert.P.V”, “Calc 2” 
and “Calc 3”). From the experiment and simulated results it may be seen that without gravity driven 
injection the core would continue to uncover. By GL 88-17 [30] the following enhancements have 
been recommended for mid-loop operation such as training, temperature and level indications, 
implementation of procedures and controls, and at least two available or operable means of adding 
inventory to the RCS that are in addition to pumps that are a part of the normal RHR systems. 
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4.4 Simulation of LOFT L9-1/L3-3 
The LOFT experiment L9-1/L3-3 tested the system response to an anticipated transient with 
multiple failures (L9-1) followed by a small-break LOCA (L3-3) due to the failure of a power-
operated relief valve (PORV). 
Experiment L9-1 was the first anticipated transient with multiple failures performed at LOFT, 
and consisted of a simulated LOFW accident with delayed reactor scram and no auxiliary feedwater 
injection. The LOFW accident was initiated due to the failure of the main feedwater pump, leading 
to the loss of coolant through the PORV, which resulted in a LOCA. 
Experiment L3-3 simulated two independent recovery procedures from the LOFW accident 
L9-1, without engaging the emergency core coolant (ECC). The first recovery mode involved 
latching open the PORV to depressurize the primary system whilst simultaneously turning off the 
primary coolant pumps. The second mode consisted of refilling the steam generator (SG) and 
removing excess decay heat through a feed-and-bleed operation of the SG secondary side. 
In short, the LOFT experiment L9-1/L3-3 was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
PORV cycling and the subsequent feed-and-bleed operation using the secondary side for removal of 
decay heat. 
The simulation was performed by RELAP5/MOD3.3 Patch 04. The transient conditions at 
1690 s is displayed in Figure 6, clearly indicating that the pressurizer has completely filled with 
fluid when the PORV cycling is initiated. Figure 7 depicts the system at 7050 seconds, upon the 
initiation of the feed-and-bleed operation in the secondary loop. 
 
Figure 6: Spray valve closed and PORV cycling initiated (t=1690 s) 
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Figure 7: SG secondary refilled, feed-and-bleed operation initiated (t=7050 s) 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The requirements to analyse design extension conditions for existing reactors have been 
introduced after Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The purpose of considering design extension 
conditions (DEC) is to further improve safety by enhancing the plant’s capability to withstand the 
conditions generated by accidents that are more severe than design basis accidents (DBAs). The 
paper first provides example lists of DEC proposed by International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA). Then, research for 
beyond design basis accidents with non-degraded core (i.e. DEC A) for existing reactors done in 
80’s and 90’ of the previous century is presented. The tests performed include total loss of 
feedwater, station blackout, small break without high pressure safety injection, steam generator tube 
rupture with no high pressure safety injection etc. Finally, simulations of few experiments 
(representing DEC A) tests performed on integral test facilities, which have been analysed at Jožef 
Stefan Institute using RELAP5 or TRACE computer code in the last three decades, have been 
presented. The review of beyond design basis accidents performed on integral test facilities and 
simulations suggest that selected DEC scenarios were studied well before the requirements on DEC 
analyses have been made. Also, before the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident several existing plants have 
already implemented certain measures to prevent severe accidents from multiple failures (e.g. 
station blackout or anticipated transients without reactor scram). 
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